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TILLICH, ADORNO, AND THE DEBATE 
ABOUT EXISTENTIALISM 
Guy B. HAMMOND 
RESUME. — On veut montrer ici que Paul Tillich et Théodore Adorno se sont engagés 
dans un dialogue important à propos de leur évaluation de Vexistentialisme et de 
ses principaux protagonistes, Kierkegaard et Heidegger. Uexamen de cette thèse 
se fait à partir d'une sélection d'écrits de Tillich et d'Adorno. La comparaison 
entre La décision socialiste de Tillich et le Kierkegaard d'Adorno trouve un point 
commun dans le thème de l'attente et de l'espérance. On trouve aussi dans les 
publications de cette même période un débat sur le concept de l'«essence» 
humaine. Les références plus récentes de Tillich à la pensée existentialiste mani-
festent l'influence de la première critique de l'existentialisme faite par Adorno, 
alors que celui-ci n'inclut pas la perspective de Tillich dans sa dernière critique. 
On en conclut que les différences marquées et persistantes entre ces deux auteurs 
ne doivent pas cacher l'importance de leurs points communs. 
SUMMARY. — It is argued that one realm of discourse where Paul Tillich and Theodor 
Adorno engaged in significant dialogue with each other was in their assessments 
of existentialism and of its leading proponents, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. This 
thesis is explored through an examination of selected publications of Tillich and 
Adorno. A comparison of Tillich's The Socialist Decision and Adorno's Kierke-
gaard: Construction of the Aesthetic/mds a common focus on the theme of expec-
tation/hope. A debate regarding the concept of a human "essence" is found in 
publications of the same period. Tillich's later use of the existentialist perspective 
is found to reflect aspects of Adorno's early critique of existentialism, and Adorno's 
later critique is shown not to include Tillich's particular version. It is concluded 
that although differences remained between them, these should not blind us to 
significant commonalities. 
Paul Tillich and Theodor Adorno are both acknowledged to be among the intellectual leaders of our time — figures who initiated major tendencies of 20th century 
thought. Because of their prominence any evidence of significant influence of either 
343 
GUY B. HAMMOND 
upon the other will be of interest to the scholarly community. Since the fact of their 
friendship over the years, both in Frankfurt and in New York City, is well known, the 
question naturally arises : was there any substantial influence of either upon the other ? 
Did their personal interactions have any appreciable effect on their philosophical or 
theological formulations? Since Tillich was already a mature, widely-published scholar 
when the much younger Adorno turned up as one of his graduate students in Frankfurt, 
can evidence of an elder mentor be detected in Adorno's writings? Or did the brilliant 
student in time come to have a major impact on his former professor? 
Some analysts have concluded that there was no significant intellectual influence 
of Tillich on Adorno. Susan Buck-Mors, in a study of Adorno entitled The Origin of 
Negative Dialectics, expresses the view that "Tillich's intellectual position was quite 
different, and he cannot be said to have influenced Adorno. Their relationship was a 
personal one"1. Martin Jay's Adorno conveys a similar impression2. On the other hand, 
few accounts of Tillich's theology list Adorno among those exerting a major influence 
on Tillich3. Are these assessments correct? What if anything did these two have in 
common beyond their "personal relationship"? In order to explore this question I 
propose to look at the ways in which Tillich and Adorno dealt with the perspective 
known as existentialism and with its leading figures (primarily Kierkegaard and Hei-
degger). I believe that the debates about existentialism and whether an existentialist 
ontology is possible and desirable proved to be one area where their interaction with 
each other was important for both. This is not to say that they agreed on all counts, 
but that each took significant account of the perspective represented by the other. At 
the very least I claim that setting their views on these issues in juxtaposition clarifies 
the positions of each. 
I. A COMPARISON OF ADORNO'S KIERKEGAARD: CONSTRUCTION OF THE AESTHETIC 
AND TILLICH' THE SOCIALIST DECISION 
I begin with a discussion of the doctoral dissertation written by Adorno under 
Tillich's supervision in 1930-31 and published in 1933: Kierkegaard: Construction of 
the Aesthetic. This difficult work has now been translated into English4. Probably the 
1. Susan BUCK-MORS, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt 
Institute, New York, The Free Press, 1977, pp. 211 and 237. 
2. Martin JAY, Adorno. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1984 Jay states that Tillich "nominally 
sponsored" Adorno's dissertation, p. 30. 
3. This gap is recognizable in the fact that Tillich's relation to Heidegger is always discussed in the literature 
on Tillich, but the Neo-Marxist criticism of Heidegger — which Tillich agreed with — is seldom given 
careful attention. Cf. eg. Alexander MCKELWAY, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, New York, Delta 
Book, 1964, p. 27; Bernard MARTIN, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich, New York, Bookman 
Associates, 1963, pp. 18, 26 and elsewhere. David HOPPER, in Tillich: A Theological Portrait, New York, 
J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1968, esp. 84; 96-100 gives a more nuanced discussion of Tillich's relation to 
Heidegger, but still without reference to Adorno. Ronald STONE, in Paul Tillich's Radical Social Thought, 
Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1980, and John STUMME in Socialism in Theological Perspective: A Study of 
Paul Tillich, 1918-1933 (Scholars Press, 1978) contribute to the overcoming of this omission. 
4. Theodor ADORNO, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
1989. 
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author's reputation for obscurity will only be enhanced in the English-speaking world 
by this translation. According to a recollection recorded in the Paucks' Tillich biography 
Tillich professed not to understand it5. But less than a year after its 1933 publication 
Tillich (already in the United States) wrote an especially clear and concise short review 
for the Journal of Philosophy6. Is there any evidence of Tillich as a dialogue partner 
in the writing of this book? Aided by a recent review by Jeanne Schuler, by the 
translator's Foreword, and by Tillich's review, I offer these tentative reflections7. 
Adorno is intent on criticizing Kierkegaard, and hence existentialism, for offering 
in fact a new form of idealism. In an ascetic fashion Kierkegaard turns away from 
real life into a subjectivity that as Schuler puts it "leaves the world as it is"8. The 
subjective ego claims freedom from the world, but this claim cannot be taken at face 
value. It ignores the way in which consciousness is dependent upon objective factors. 
The anxieties and insecurities of the supposedly isolated self are actually the creation 
of particular social circumstances. Kierkegaard's construction of the self amounts to 
an idealist ontology where the self is pictured in retreat from history into an abstract 
"nature". And Adorno sees this "flight toward subjectivity" as, in the words of Tillich's 
review, at the same time "a flight into the prehistoric regions of myth"9. 
Alongside this static ontology of subjectivity, however, Adorno finds something 
else more fragile and fleeting. In the melancholy of the aesthetic he finds alongside 
of the "defiant self assertion" of "autonomous subjectivity" a shattered, melancholic 
subjectivity. Melancholy, says Adorno, appears early and late in Kierkegaard "breaking 
through the foundation of subjectivity and polarizing itself objectively into judgment 
and grace"10. "Its ruins", he says, "are the ciphers on which Kierkegaard reflects, 
and hope (Hoffnung) is integral to the absurdity of its desire."11 The longing found 
here is not for the restoration of a "lost immediacy" but for an impossible yet promised 
future fulfillment. Commenting on Kierkegaard's assertion in the fragmentary "Dia-
psalmata" that "my soul has lost its potentiality", Adorno explains: "Such potentiality 
is not so much a mirage of what has been lost as an unfulfilled, thin, prophetic, but 
nevertheless exact scheme of what is to be. [...] In contradiction to the superficial 
intention of systematic completeness, the 'Diapsalmata' work toward the 'original 
script of human existence'."12 Adorno proceeds to describe two different responses to 
these traces and fragments of a longed-for happiness. "Endless, useless reading" of 
these signs is the "empty infinity of the reflection of the 'aesthetic' [...] individual 
which can be broken only by 'decisiveness'" ; yet for Adorno there is no surer escape 
5. Wilhelm PAUCK and Marion PAUCK, Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought, Vol. I: Life, New York, Harper 
and Row, 1976, p. 116. 
6. Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen, Reviewed by Paul TILLICH, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
xxxi, No. 23 (Nov. 8, 1934), p. 640. 
7. Cf. Jeanne A. SCHULER, "Adorno's Kierkegaard" in Telos, 69 (Fall, 1989), pp. 191-196. 
8. SCHULER, "Adorno's Kierkegaard", p. 193. 
9. TILLICH, Kierkegaard, p. 640. 
10. ADORNO, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, p. 123. 
11. Ibid., p. 124. 
12. Ibid., p. 125. 
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from despair. In the following poetic passage Adorno locates Kierkegaard's hope in 
a longing for a never-yet-realized but promised happiness. 
Yet no truer image of hope can be imagined than that of ciphers, readable as 
traces, dissolving in history, disappearing in front of overflowing eyes, indeed 
confirmed in lamentation. In these tears of despair the ciphers appear as incan-
descent figures, dialectically, as compassion, comfort, and hope. Dialectical mel-
ancholy does not mourn vanished happiness. It knows that it is unreachable. But 
it knows also of the promise (Versprechen) that conjoins the unreachable, precisely 
in its origin, with the wish. [...] Such hope rejects all mythical deception, all 
claim to having once existed, by this never [S.K.'s "never have I been happy"]: 
it is promised as unattainable ; whereas, if it were directly asserted as reality, it 
would regress to the mythological and phantasmagorical, surrendering itself to 
the lost and past. [...] Although the wish that follows this aim [of an eternal 
happiness without sacrifice] is unfulfillable and yet full of hope, it originates in 
its aim. [...] Accordingly, in Kierkegaard homesickness for happiness answers 
the disguised Utopian wish as the eschatological rescue of his gnosis: "the trick 
would be to feel homesick notwithstanding one is at home".13 
It is possible to recognize in Adorno's ode to melancholy (Schwermul) overtones 
of Tillich's discussion of the way prophetic "expectation" tears consciousness away 
from the "myth of origin"14. 1 believe that the thread of Adorno's "research of hope" 
which runs through the Kierkegaard volume15 is matched by the thread of expectation 
which runs through Tillich's The Socialist Decision. A note on the publication history 
of these two works is in order. Stumme tells us that Tillich wrote the bulk of his book 
in the summer of 193216. Tillich says in his Foreword that it grew out of lectures given 
in October, 1931, and more generally "from many years of preoccupation with the 
problem of socialism, and from the joint labors of friends and working groups in 
Berlin and Frankfurt"17. Adorno had been acquainted with the writings of Kierkegaard 
for some years when he wrote his dissertation in 1930/31. The book was thoroughly 
revised (though the basic ideas remained unchanged), Robert Hullot-Kentor tells us, 
in September and October of 193218. Thus the two books took final form at virtually 
the same moment, after several years of gestation in both cases. And the books shared 
a similar fate: coming out at the very time that Hitler came to power they both fell 
from sight until the post-war period. 
What were the origins of their mutual interest in the orientation of life toward an 
imagined future ? I do not feel prepared to answer this question, but I offer the following 
observations. John Stumme tells us that Tillich began using the theme of expectation 
13. Ibid., p. 126. 
14. Cf. e.g. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, pp. 20-23. Tillich generally uses the term Erwartung rather than 
Hoffung which is used by Adorno (see The Socialist Decision, p. 105 where Tillich explains that wart en 
is a passive waiting while erwarten is awaiting, a more active verb. However, at p. 69 he uses Hoffnung.) 
Tillich and Adorno both use the verb verheissen, to promise. 
15. Cf. the use of the phrase "research of hope" in application to Adorno by Robert Hullot-Kentor, in the 
translator's Foreword, p. xxi. Both Tillich and Adorno are attempting to discover a means of uniting 
transcendence and immanence: compare Tillich, pp. 110-111 with Adorno, pp. 68-69. 
16. STUMMH, Socialism in Theological Perspective: A Study of Paul Tillich 1918-1933, p. 100. 
17. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, pp. xxxv-xxxvi. 
18. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, p. xx. 
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"around 1929"19; it is central to several essays of his Frankfurt period. Tillich would 
not have been influenced by Adorno this early, while it is quite possible that Adorno 
knew Tillich's essays. Both were attracted to heterodox Marxists like Ernst Bloch (both 
knew his work Spirit of Utopia). It seems clear that Adorno was influenced in his 
meditations on hope by Walter Benjamin20. An investigation of the roots of expectation 
in Tillich and hope in Adorno would be an interesting project. 
Adorno's book is a critique of Kierkegaard's existential ontology of subjectivity; 
Tillich's a critique of the bourgeois principle of individualism. The former book focuses 
on individual consciousness ; the latter on political and social issues. But both draw 
a contrast between supposedly autonomous individuals trapped in abstraction, myth, 
and repetition, on the one hand, and on the other hand individuals — fragmented but 
future-oriented — who are open to hope and to reconciliation. 
In Adorno's book the content of hope derives from the realm of the aesthetic, 
from fantasy21, but for Adorno the aesthetic and the religious converge22. Hullot-Kentor 
makes the following rather startling contribution to the debate about the place of 
religion in Adorno's work: suggesting that Adorno dropped certain theological motifs 
in the revised 1932 version of his Kierkegaard book, Hullot-Kentor continues: "This, 
however, is more of a sublimination than excision, for theology is always moving right 
under the surface of all of Adorno's writings. [...] Opaque ideas in Adorno (as in 
Benjamin) often become immediately comprehensible when grasped in this context 
of theological interests. The idea of 'truth-content' for example, which has remained 
so obscure, is a work's content of hope."23 Now I am sure that this judgment will be 
disputed by other Adorno scholars. But it reopens the question of the extent to which 
Adorno at some deeper level took theology (and perhaps even Tillich's theology) very 
seriously. 
Tillich's book sets out to explore the roots of political thinking, both bourgeois-
capitalist and socialist. But questioning the roots of thinking (which might be called 
ideology critique) leads to questions of human being, to a doctrine of human nature. 
Finding themselves in existence, human beings ask about origins; in doing so they 
19. STUMME, Socialism in Theological Perspective, p. 48. 
20. For Tillich's essays, cf. Political Expectation (New York, Harper and Row, 1971); BLOCH'S Geist der Utopie 
came out in a revised edition in 1923; for Bloch, cf. Hope and its Hieroglyph: A Critical Decipherment 
of Ernst Bloch's Principle of Hope, by Richard H. Roberts (Scholars Press, 1990); Walter BENJAMIN'S 
Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften (1922) concludes with reflections on hope: cf. BENJAMIN'S Schriften, Band 
Ein (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), pp. 137-140. (For this reference and insight on the relations of 
Benjamin, Adorno, Bloch and Tillich I am grateful to Lucien PELLETIER. Cf. his unpublished essay, "Paul 
Tillich, Ernst Bloch, and the Metaphysical Meaning of Action"). Hartmut SCHEIBLE in a recent German 
work, Theodor W. Adorno (Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989), p. 67, suggests an influence 
of Bloch on Adorno's Kierkegaard book, but it is not clear that this applies to the theme of "hope". For 
Benjamin's influence on Adorno here cf. Wayne W. Floyd, Jr., Theology and the Dialectic of Otherness: 
On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno (New York, University Presses of America, 1988), pp. 268-270. 
21. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, pp. 137-140. 
22. Ibid., pp. 133, 140. Scheible writes regarding this issue: "If [for Adorno] however the simple exhibition 
of images would already be a surety of salvation, then the original religious content is not secularized 
through art, but art is transformed into religion." (ADORNO p. 68; my translation). 
23. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, p. xxi. 
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are led to "myths of origin" and to ontology24. "Ontology is the final and most abstract 
version of the myth of origin."25 By reopening the question of ontology (after Kant 
had sought to close this door in the 19th century), Tillich here may reveal the influence 
of Martin Heidegger in its early stages. By the early 1930s Tillich was beginning to 
absorb from Heidegger and others a doctrine of man which permitted a new post-
Kantian ontology. Heidegger taught him, he says in a 1944 essay, that "the v/ay to 
ontology passes through the doctrine of man"26. Already by 1932, however, this 
Heideggerian ontology was coming under fire from Tillich's Frankfurt colleagues for 
its conservative, static, even reactionary implications. Tilbch's acknowledgement of 
the legitimacy of this criticism is visible in his association of ontology with the quest 
for origins and the myth of origin. 
He proceeds by asserting that a doctrine of man which asks only about origins 
is incomplete. Human beings are not bound by origins; because they are free they 
must ask (unconditionally, as Tillich says) about goals as well. Is there a givenness 
to mankind's destiny as well as its origin? This question was to become the crux of 
discussions with Adorno, for it leads to issues regarding myths and ontologies of 
human destiny. Tillich equivocates on the latter issue. He asserts that concepts derived 
from "expectation" "cannot be grasped ontologically", because "the new being is 
intrinsically unontological"27. Yet he also states that ontology can be justified if "it 
has been broken by a philosophy of history"2*. Heidegger failed to perceive this; he 
took account of time and historicity, but only abstractly, without reference to real 
history. Tillich begins to see Heidegger as Adorno would also see him: Heidegger 
ontologized Kierkegaard's individual but was stuck with the privatized, solitary self. 
What was lacking in Heidegger, Tillich says in a 1935 essay, was the dynamic, 
historical-eschatological sense of Marxism29. 
Adorno also equivocated on the issue of ontology in the Kierkegaard work. In 
one of the most dialectical passages in the book Adorno argues, against Heidegger, 
that it is a "misrepresentation" of Kierkegaard to find in him an existential-ontological 
interest. "Individual existence is for Kierkegaard the arena of ontology only because 
it itself is not ontological."30 But Adorno has not wholly given up on the "rescue of 
ontology"31. He writes: "Therefore it is not the total self and its total structure, but 
24. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, pp. 2-3. 
25. Ibid., p. 18. 
26. TILLICH, "Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning", in Theology of Culture, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1959, p. 98. 
27. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, p. 20. Cf. Tillich's 1927 essay, "Eschatologie und Geschichte", where he 
discusses how time and decision break through the "circles of being" (Seinkreises). (Gesammelte Werke, 
VI, esp. p. 77) I am indebted to Professor Jean Richard for this reference. 
28. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, p. 166, n. 6. 
29. TILLICH, "The Christian and the Marxist View of Man", December, 1935, Harvard Paul Tillich Archives, 
p. 9. 
30. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, pp. 70-71. 
31. Hullot-Kentor's phrase, in ADORNO, Kierkegaard, XXI. 
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exclusively the fragment of collapsing existence, free of all subjective 'meaning', that 
is a sign of hope ; its fault lines are the true ciphers, at once historical and ontological."32 
Adorno was to move further away from this position later; Tillich was to return 
to it. Tillich's The Socialist Decision is historically concrete; Adorno's Kierkegaard 
is more abstract. Tillich's expectation leads to specific moral action in a crisis situation: 
the unconditional decision for socialism. Thus hope for Tillich here leads out of endless 
repetition and into ethical decision (yet without Utopian illusions). Adorno, overtly 
analyzing a 19th century thinker, in fact has in view a critique of a 20th century 
example of ontological abstraction. By implication he portrays Heidegger's philosophy 
as one that leaves persons trapped in subjectivity without the shards of hope found 
in Kierkegaard. As Buck-Mors and Schuler suggest, Adorno's broader aim was "to 
deflect the swelling interest in existentialism to Marxism"33. But if so he takes a 
strange approach. The delineation of hope in Adorno's Kierkegaard leaves it fragile 
and ephemeral, without roots in any firm reality. Only in fantasy — another subjectivity, 
although Adorno attempts to find objective elements in it — is there a prospect of 
reconciliation. 
The association of ontology with static myth was one that Tillich would later 
abandon. Some have argued that when Tillich later attempts to encompass eschatology 
within ontology he loses the forward-looking tension and concreteness of The Socialist 
Decision™. In that work transcendence is associated with the future: time is given 
priority over space. When eschatology is again subordinated to ontology, the reverse 
may happen, and the consequence may once again be abstractness and myth. 
II. THE DEBATE ABOUT A HUMAN ESSENCE 
The debate about a human "essence" engaged in by Tillich and Adorno is closely 
related to the above concerns. This was to be a bone of contention not only between 
Tillich and Frankfurt School members but also within the School as well. Tillich 
asserts the need for a concept of essence (without, we might add, clarifying how it 
could be un-ontological)35 and defends it against its critics. His principal antagonist 
on this matter was surely Adorno, as can be seen from Adorno's treatment of the 
matter in his first professorial lecture, "The Actuality of Philosophy", delivered in 
1931 (while he was engaged in writing the Kierkegaard work). Regarding ontology, 
Adorno asserts in that lecture : "The idea of being has become powerless in philosophy ; 
it is nothing more than an empty form-principle whose archaic dignity helps to cover 
any content whatsoever."36 It is clear that he has Heidegger most immediately in mind 
here. It is as if he criticizes Tillich by anticipation. He goes on to suggest that Heidegger 
"falls back on precisely the latest plan for a subjective ontology produced by Western 
32. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, p. 139, cf. p. 138. 
33. SCHULER, Adorno's Kierkegaard, p. 192. 
34. Cf. STUMME, Socialism in Theological Perspective, pp. 98, 237-241. 
35. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, p. 5. 
36. ADORNO, "The Actuality of Philosophy", Telos, 31 (Spring, 1977), p. 120. 
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thinking: the existentialist philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard"37. And he accuses Hei-
degger of ontologizing time and history. Then after defending a Marxian dialectical 
materialism (more clearly than in the Kierkegaard book) he turns to the concept of 
man understood as an essence or ideal. He urges the divorce of philosophy from these 
"mythic archetypes", even those "which psychoanalysis lights upon [...]"38. Next he 
recognizes an objection (quite likely, I think, to have been made by Tillich): "The 
central objection is that my conception, too, is based on a concept of man, a blueprint 
of Being (Entwurf des Daseins) [...]."39 Adorno answers by admitting this charge, 
but argues that thought need not pursue its own presuppositions. He concludes: "The 
breaking of what is irreducible, however, occurs concrete-historically and thus it is 
history which retards the movement of thought to its presuppositions."40 
This resistance to philosophical anthropology and to a doctrine of essence was 
to characterize Adorno's thought throughout his career. Horkheimer largely agreed, 
although he and Adorno were never reluctant to make normative judgments. Tillich 
sought to rebut their arguments. A case can be made that the following claim by 
Tillich was never effectively countered by Horkheimer or Adorno. (Fromm and Marcuse 
would have found it even more difficult to disagree.) Tillich writes: 
Thus it is certainly not necessary to posit an eternal human nature; but it is 
necessary to understand humanity living in encounter and in history, as a unity, 
since otherwise nothing at all could be asserted, even about the most concrete 
historical phenomenon. Most significantly, every norm would thereby be invali-
dated. The passion with which representatives of this professedly radical historical 
form of thinking make value judgments — for example about capitalism — shows 
that they are by no means lacking in awareness of the normative dimension. On 
the contrary, they have a vision of human society in which the human being will 
find a better fulfillment than it does at present.41 
I believe that Tillich felt he had won this argument with Adorno, even though the 
latter never capitulated. He had the early Marx on his side and even much in Freud 
could be coopted. And I am sure that he convinced Fromm, though never Adorno. 
Marcuse adopted positions similar to those of Tillich42. 
III. TILLICH ON EXISTENTIALISM AND CRITICAL THEORY 
With the issue of essence settled, Tillich might have found the key dialogue partner 
for Christian anthropology: the Western Marxism of the Frankfurt School. In an essay 
entitled "The Christian and the Marxist View of Man" (December 1935), Tillich refers 
to Max Horkheimer and the Marxist rejection of "the new German anthropology" 
37. Ibid., p. 123. 
38. Ibid., p. 131. 
39. Ibid., p. 131. 
40. Ibid., p. 132. 
41. TILLICH, The Socialist Decision, p. 165, n. 7. 
42. JAY, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 274; Herbert MARCUSE, Hegel's 
Ontology and the Theory of Historicity (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1987). This work first appeared in 
1932. 
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(mentioning Scheler and Heidegger), based on the fact that this anthropology is reac-
tionary in failing to recognize that the self-contradictory actual world can "furnish 
no model"43. Tillich agrees; and citing a large Frankfurt School work about to appear 
(Authority and the Family), Tillich observes : "Even more important it is that in different 
places at present, particularly in the group of workers behind the Zeitschrift fuer 
Sozialforschung already mentioned, there is taking place a joining of Marxist and 
psychoanalytic ideas, with equally fertilizing effect on both."44 This kind of work 
leads Tillich to the following conclusion: "It may be maintained that Christianity, 
especially in its more prophetic types, and Marxism, especially in its original form 
in Marx himself, exhibit a close typological affinity."45 For a constructive dialogue 
to occur, thinks Tillich, "Christianity would have to understand Marxism as the 
prophetic-immanent element of its own essence, become independent and driven into 
opposition; and to search for a way of receiving it again into itself. This [...] was the 
endeavor of religious socialism"46. 
Now in the light of these observations and in the light of the major deficiencies 
uncovered in the "new German anthropology", why wasn't Critical Theory or Western 
Marxism the "good luck of Christian theology" ? Why was existentialism chosen by 
Tillich instead of Critical Theory for purposes of the description of human existence? 
In one sense we know the answer: there was no popular "market" for Marxism in 
the States in the forties and fifties. But this answer is insufficient. A native-born 
"existential analysis" was already emerging in the forties that Tillich was in a position 
to augment and bolster. Richard Niebuhr's Taylor lectures of 1940, published in 1941 
as The Meaning of Revelation, constitute existential analysis (which in the fifties we 
learned to call "social existentialism") in everything but the name (the word "exis-
tential" — in quotes — is used by Richard Niebuhr only in the Preface47 and without 
reference to Kierkegaard, Heidegger, or Freud). But Tillich in a review of this book 
states : It is "a book with which I find myself in agreement as it rarely happens between 
theologians of a very different background, a book which is the introduction into 
existential thinking in present American theology"48. In those years Tillich was of the 
school of thought which says: if you can't lick them, then join them. 
But Tillich was not so easily "licked" either. Instead of advocating Critical Theory 
over existentialism, he includes the former in the latter. Was he the first to include 
Marxian and Freudian analysis under the rubric of existentialism? I can't document 
any such claim, but he was surely one of the most prominent of those who did so. 
Someone might look at his essays on Kierkegaard of 1942, and his articles on exis-
tentialism of the forties, to see the extent to which Tillich incorporated Adorno's 
critique in his evaluation of the existentialists. On the other side, one wonders what 
Adorno's reaction was to this grouping of Marx together with Heidegger. 
43. TILLICH, "The Christian and the Marxist View of Man", p. 1. 
44. Ibid., p. 2. 
45. Ibid., p. 14. 
46. Ibid., p. 17. 
47. Richard NIEBUHR, The Meaning of Revelation, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1952, p. VII. 
48. TILLICH, "Existential Thinking in American theology", n.d., Harvard, Paul Tillich Archives. 
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In a 1953 essay entitled "The Person in a Technical Society"49 Tillich gives an 
account of existentialism as he then understood it. Describing it as a movement which 
"rebels in the name of personality against the depersonalizing forces of technical 
society"50, Tillich proceeds to characterize its "lonely prophets of the 19th century": 
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche. His account of Kierkegaard shows evidence of 
Adorno's influence. Kierkegaard is pictured as protesting the loss of the existing 
individual in the world process as described by Hegel. Hegel's system is identified 
as the "idealistic mirror of technical society", a metaphor which may have been drawn 
from Adorno's discussion of the "mirror" of the bourgeois apartment in his Kierkegaard 
work51. Tillich's critique of the Kierkegaardian "leap" is Adorno-esque: "[The indi-
vidual] is free in the moment of his leap. But his leap into freedom involves the 
sacrifice of his freedom. The power of technical society is manifest in this conflict 
between rational necessity and the leap of freedom. The person is lost if rational 
necessity prevails. He tries to save himself by the leap which, however, leads to new 
forms of servitude, natural or supernatural ones."52 Thus Tillich agrees with Adorno's 
conclusion that the Kierkegaardian leap is "more an expression of despair than an 
answer"53. 
Next Marx is brought on the scene by Tillich as an existentialist who gives not 
an idealistic mirroring of technical society but a "realistic description". "Marx saw 
much more clearly than Kierkegaard that it is not a system of thought but the reality 
of modern society which is responsible for the reduction of the person to a com-
modity."54 Clearly Tillich's version of existentialism here takes on aspects which make 
it much less vulnerable to Adorno's criticism (but perhaps at the risk of blurring its 
outlines). In any case the ambiguities and failures of subsequent Marxism indicate 
that it too is an unsatisfactory answer to "dehumanization". 
Nietzsche and the philosophy of life movement (Tillich groups psychoanalysis 
under this rubric) "saw more sharply than did Kierkegaard and Marx the deepest roots 
of the dehumanizing and depersonalizing tendencies of modern society"55. Looking 
for "some unity below the split into subject and object" they found the unconscious, 
the instincts, the demonic, also repression, anxiety, and compulsion. By his inclusion 
of depth psychology in existentialism Tillich overturns the concentration on individual 
consciousness usually identified with this school of philosophy, the theme which 
Adorno attacks most relentlessly. 
The concluding section of Tillich's essay introduces an element of confusion into 
his definitions. He speaks here of "three great movements of protest against dehu-
manization" : the movements for creative life (existentialists show up here) ; the move-
49. TILLICH, "The Person in a Technical Society", in Varieties of Modern Social Theory, ed. by Hendrik M. 
Ruitenbeek, New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1963. 
50. Ibid., p. 287. 
51. ADORNO, Kierkegaard, pp. 40-46. 
52. TILLICH, "The Person in a Technical Society", p. 259. 
53. Ibid., p. 275. 
54. Ibid., p. 289. 
55. Ibid., p. 291. 
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ments for social justice (bourgeois revolutionaries, social critics, and Marx), and 
Christian and other movements which "partly in dependence on Kierkegaard" have 
discovered man's "estrangement from the ground of his being and meaning"56. Whether 
all three of these movements are to be called existentialist is less clear than one might 
have expected. Rather, the effort to coordinate these three great movements in order 
to deepen our comprehension of the individual in modern society sounds much more 
like the project of the Institute for Social Research as initially outlined by Max 
Horkheimer: the effort to develop a social philosophy which discovers connections 
between "the economic life of society, the psychological development of its individuals 
and changes within specific areas of culture" (i.e., science, art, religion, customs, etc. 
— in other words ideological change)57. This synthesis of Marxism, psychoanalysis, 
and culture criticism characterized the Frankfurt School early and late. Was Tillich 
an existentialist or a Critical Theorist? 
IV. ADORNO ON EXISTENTIALISM 
Adorno in 1964 published Jargon der Eigentlichkeit : zur deutschen Idéologie (The 
Jargon of Authenticity)5*. The compounding of Adorno's forbidding prose with that of 
Heidegger in this work does not make for light reading. (Nor does the fact that there 
are no chapter divisions in an essay of 165 pages.) The work concludes that German 
existentialism in the post-World War II years has become an ideology which mystifies 
actual social relations. For example Adorno quotes from an appreciative study of 
Heidegger that summarizes Heidegger's treatment of man's need for shelter: "[Hei-
degger] aims at this fundamental meaning of residing for all human existence, and in 
this remark he focuses on the 'need for residences' as one of the great difficulties of 
our time: 'The true need for residences', he says here, 'consists not first of all in the 
absence of residences' although this need should by no means be taken lightly ; but 
behind this need a deeper one is hidden, that man has lost his own nature and so 
cannot come to rest. 'The true need for residence consists in the fact that mortals 
must first learn to reside.'" Adorno comments: "that which announces itself, in the 
game about the need for residences, is more serious than the pose of existential 
seriousness. It is the fear of unemployment, lurking in all citizens of countries of high 
capitalism [...]. Angst [...] is historical [...]; it appears in fact that those who are 
yoked into a society which is [...] contradictory to the deepest core constantly feel 
threatened by what sustains them."59 This kind of criticism — following the general 
lines of his Kierkegaard critique but without finding in this literature those Utopian 
ciphers that were glimpsed in Kierkegaard's fantasy — is directed toward existentialism 
in general and Heidegger and Jaspers in particular. 
56. Ibid., pp. 301-303. 
57. Max HORKHEIMER, "The State of Contemporary Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social 
Research", in Critical Theory and Society, ed. by Stephen Bronner and Douglas Kellner, New York, 
Routledge, 1989, p. 34. 
58. ADORNO, The Jargon of Authenticity, Evanston, 111., Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
59. Ibid., pp. 33-35. 
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Does Adorno include Tillich in this general condemnation? We may shed some 
light on this question by reflecting upon a possible allusion to Tillich in the text. 
After a paragraph expressing distaste for the language of depth, Adorno has this 
to say about religion: "The jargon secularizes the German readiness to view men's 
positive relation to religion as something immediately positive, even when the religion 
has disintegrated and been exposed as something untrue. The undiminished irrationality 
of rational society encourages people to elevate religion into an end in itself, without 
regard to its content: to view religion as a mere attitude, as a quality of subjectivity. 
All this at the cost of religion itself. One needs to be a believer — no matter what 
he believes in."60 In the Forword, the editor, Trent Schroyer, quotes Tillich to the 
effect that existentialism is a protest movement "against the dehumanization of man 
in industrial society"61, and then describes Adorno's book as a critique of the critique. 
Asserting with Adorno that the jargon of existentialism loses sight of the "objective 
context of human society" in its "compression of all historical consciousness into the 
sphere of self-experience", Schroyer finds that for illustration Adorno "cites Martin 
Buber's / and Thou and Paul Tillich's stress that religiosity is an end in itself". Both 
are "instances of the shift to subjectivity as an in-it-selfness. In both cases the words 
are referred to the immediacy of life, to attitudinal and qualificative aspects of self-
experience. One needs only to be a believer; the objective content of belief has been 
eclipsed in the subjectivization of objective content"62. 
So says Schroyer. But it is possible to find something a bit different in the passage 
quoted from Adorno. It may indeed allude to a tendency found in Tillich as well as 
elsewhere: "Society encourages people to elevate religion mto an end in itself." But 
I believe it is significant that Adorno does not cite Tillich (here or elsewhere in the 
book). Buber is cited63 ; Heidegger and Jaspers are pilloried mercilessly in detail and 
at great length. And the passage referred to suggests that the loss of content with the 
accompanying irrationality is detrimental to true religion — an emphasis which Tillich 
sought, successfully or unsuccessfully, to uphold, as Adorno well knew. It must be 
remembered also that Adorno in fact wanted to acknowledge a "moment" of truth in 
the existentialist emphasis on subjectivity. In a later passage, speaking of the "inher-
itors" of Hegel and Kierkegaard, he writes: 
[They] by slight of hand changed unhappy consciousness into a happy nondialectic 
one [...]. They cleanse inwardness of that element which contains its truth, by 
eliminating self-reflection [...]. The hardened inwardness of today idolizes its 
own purity, which has supposedly been blemished by ontic elements. At least in 
this regard the outset of contemporary ontology coincides with the cult of inward-
ness. The retreat of ontology from the course of the world is also a retreat from 
the empirical content of subjectivity.64 
60. Ibid., p. 21. 
61. Ibid., p. VII. 
62. Ibid., p. XIV. 
63. Ibid., p. 16. 
64. Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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Would Adorno place Tillich in the "cult of subjectivity"? I think not (not the 
author of The Socialist Decision, and the essays of The Protestant Era and Political 
Expectation); he might have been willing, however, to warn his friend that at times 
he came perilously close. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
By the time of Werk und Wirken Paul Tillichs (1967), Adorno was able to recall 
Tillich's "flirtation" with existentialism with bemusement and tolerance. Tillich's ten-
dency toward building a system, he noted, meant that "to this extent he stood against 
existentialism which interpreted individual being as the final norm, although [Tillich] 
occasionally flirted with Heidegger's concepts"65. And again, Adorno says with sym-
pathy that Tillich stood at "an extremely opposite pole from Karl Barth" in a way 
which brought out the existentialist tendency to "put the truth more in the solitary 
subject and in his connection to the truth", rather than to attribute to it an objective 
character. Adorno then expressed his wonderment over the fact that "the authors of 
The Courage to Be and The Jargon of Authenticity could remain in close connection 
with each other. But Tillich meant something different. He meant something correct, 
something human. With him the repressive and the authoritarian were completely 
absent"66. 
Differences remained between Tillich and Adorno, to be sure, though Susan Buck-
Mors' conclusion that they had nothing in common seems clearly incorrect. They did 
mean something different by the term "existentialism" but to some extent each for-
mulated his position in response to the other. (Adorno indeed says that his book 
Negative Dialectics was directed against Tillich's affirmations67.) The fact of differences 
between them should not blind us to significant commonalities. 
65. Werk und Wirken Paul Tillichs: Ein Gedenkbuch, ed. by Max Horkheimer et al., Stuttgart, Evangelisches 
Verlagswerk, 1967, p. 32. My translations here and below. 
66. Ibid., p. 33. 
67. Ibid., p. 34. 
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